The very nature of energy security has two opposite approaches in its definition: security direction i.e. an approach from “security” point of view, mainly national and military security; and second direction, which regards the given concept from economic point of view.
Security approach implies direct state control over energy resources, energy companies and transportation routes, providing them with appropriate safety and security through military bases and military cooperation. Energy security is based on bilateral governmental relations using both diplomatic and military means for goal achievement.
Economic approach, by contrast, regards energy security from the perspective of high/low prices, their volatility and influence on macroeconomic situation, and studies the necessity of transition to new sources of energy (renewable resources, for example). Based on economic approach, energy security is a very expensive issue, which can be solved only in the framework of well-functioning market mechanisms.
This dual nature of energy security raises two strategies for energy security of a given state: a strategy based on market relations, and the strategy of direct state control over energy resources. Various strategies have become the basis for designing appropriate foreign policy of a state, which is very different, and often at odds with the policy of another state, despite that each of them might face the same threats to their energy security. As a result, based on perception of each state, there is a choice that appears between preventive and responsive, cooperative (joint) and competitive, legal and power measures for ensuring energy security.
This psychological aspect – the question of ambiguous perception – plays a significant role in explaining some of the existing contradictions between the energy players. It should be emphasized that discrepant perception of the problem stems from the existing specific institutional environment in the various departments and ministries within the government that often offer contradicting scenarios of problem solving to the administration. In many respects, achieving a balance of interests between the ministries is the result of enormous efforts of the government that requires painstaking work on the coordination of positions and approaches, contrary to popular opinion in an analytical environment which indicates that politics is the result of a common understanding of risks, goals and objectives, integrated into a unified strategy.
In this context, i.e. in terms of the psychological aspect, we should note another interesting approach – the question of identity as one of the key issues of energy security. According to experts, the practice of energy cooperation of some countries shows that the factor of identity, namely the relationship (positive or negative), formed over a long period of history, also has some impact on the development prospects of bilateral trade and economic, political and diplomatic relations, including the energy sector. Particularly, this approach explains, the Russian-German relationship by the example of building “Nord Stream” on the one hand, and, the strong opposition of Poland against development any pipeline projects under the supervision of Russia, on the other.
The concept of energy security has borders with geopolitics and market economics. This interpretation reveals the most complete content of energy security. Moreover, taking into account the current trends in the global energy market, geopolitical component of energy is increasingly strengthening, thereby producing a direct impact on other aspects of world politics. In fact, energy security has become an integral part of regional and international security in the broadest sense.
According to some analysts, increased geopolitical dimension – energy as an instrument of foreign policy – has a negative impact on other aspects of international security, thus, undermines the international community's efforts in stabilizing and bringing peace in several regions and countries.
Another constituent of the geopolitical energy security is the competition for access to strategic energy fields, and other related problems to ensure continuity of global oil supplies.
First, the intensification of various power players in a particular region is accompanied by an increased concern of neighboring and/or other countries, considering this region a "zone of their own privileged interests".
Second, any energy infrastructure – laying of gas pipes, implementation of continental and maritime transportation of energy resources, construction of terminals, energy hubs, oil platforms, strategic reserves, large power plants, etc. - all this inevitably creates a definite presence of the energy player in a region who creates energy infrastructure around its perimeter. Over time, such a presence may go beyond a pure energy field, affecting other aspects of regional policy and security.
It is noteworthy in this context the activation in the waters of the Arctic Ocean of all coastal states, which is associated with the observed climate changes in the region, in particular, the melting of ice, and the emergence of an enabling environment for the development of new oil fields in the Arctic, the size of which is estimated equal to the resources of the Middle East. Certain "skirmishes" already exist at a panel box among the coastal States regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf and economic zones, so competition over access to Arctic resources is gaining momentum.
With regard to continental traffic, it can be stated that energy security is beginning to be reflected in the military and political strategy of some countries and blocs. Here, it should be noted that energy security is already included in the concept of NATO, which was motivated by the danger of destabilization of energy supplies from the side of terrorists by sabotage attacks on the pipeline routes of oil and gas.
This means that NATO will have adequate powers to prevent the risk of supply failure and to respond to possible attacks on energy infrastructure, i.e. threat to energy security of the members of the bloc, by all means.
As evidence, after the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict, during the NATO Summit in Riga, November 2006, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar proposed to extend Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty by inclusion of cases threatening the energy security of the bloc members.  As we know, Article 5 requires commitment of collective defense against aggression made towards any member-country of NATO.
The urgency of this issue was particularly intensified in light of the Georgia-South Ossetia military conflict in August 2008, when oil supplies through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline were temporarily halted.
Geopolitical component of energy security is particularly strong in the background of Russia's energy policy. From the perspective of most Western politicians and analysts, the reduction of gas supplies from Russia to Europe through the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in early 2006 and 2009, was not the consequence of commercial and economic reasons, but political and geopolitical ones. In the international analytical environment there is a widespread opinion that the "gas valve" is a powerful instrument of pressure and promotion of Russia’s national interests in Europe, where the issue of energy dependence of Europe shows up in the political, diplomatic and military agenda of Russian-European relations; this goes beyond purely energy dialogue.
From the above we can state that the geopolitical component of energy security, expressed in terms of “pipeline politics” and “ensuring lasting presence” in a given region, plays a key role in understanding the essential nature of energy security. Trends of dominant energy priorities in the foreign policy of states, in turn, put a serious mark on a number of other issues of regional and world politics. Thus, energy security has become to some extent, a prerequisite for national, regional and international security in general.
The very nature of energy security has two opposite approaches in its definition: security direction i.e. an approach from “security” point of view, mainly national and military security; and second direction, which regards the given concept from economic point of view.
Security approach implies direct state control over energy resources, energy companies and transportation routes, providing them with appropriate safety and security through military bases and military cooperation. Energy security is based on bilateral governmental relations using both diplomatic and military means for goal achievement.
Economic approach, by contrast, regards energy security from the perspective of high/low prices, their volatility and influence on macroeconomic situation, and studies the necessity of transition to new sources of energy (renewable resources, for example). Based on economic approach, energy security is a very expensive issue, which can be solved only in the framework of well-functioning market mechanisms.
This dual nature of energy security raises two strategies for energy security of a given state: a strategy based on market relations, and the strategy of direct state control over energy resources. Various strategies have become the basis for designing appropriate foreign policy of a state, which is very different, and often at odds with the policy of another state, despite that each of them might face the same threats to their energy security. As a result, based on perception of each state, there is a choice that appears between preventive and responsive, cooperative (joint) and competitive, legal and power measures for ensuring energy security.
This psychological aspect – the question of ambiguous perception – plays a significant role in explaining some of the existing contradictions between the energy players. It should be emphasized that discrepant perception of the problem stems from the existing specific institutional environment in the various departments and ministries within the government that often offer contradicting scenarios of problem solving to the administration. In many respects, achieving a balance of interests between the ministries is the result of enormous efforts of the government that requires painstaking work on the coordination of positions and approaches, contrary to popular opinion in an analytical environment which indicates that politics is the result of a common understanding of risks, goals and objectives, integrated into a unified strategy.
In this context, i.e. in terms of the psychological aspect, we should note another interesting approach – the question of identity as one of the key issues of energy security. According to experts, the practice of energy cooperation of some countries shows that the factor of identity, namely the relationship (positive or negative), formed over a long period of history, also has some impact on the development prospects of bilateral trade and economic, political and diplomatic relations, including the energy sector. Particularly, this approach explains, the Russian-German relationship by the example of building “Nord Stream” on the one hand, and, the strong opposition of Poland against development any pipeline projects under the supervision of Russia, on the other.
The concept of energy security has borders with geopolitics and market economics. This interpretation reveals the most complete content of energy security. Moreover, taking into account the current trends in the global energy market, geopolitical component of energy is increasingly strengthening, thereby producing a direct impact on other aspects of world politics. In fact, energy security has become an integral part of regional and international security in the broadest sense.
According to some analysts, increased geopolitical dimension – energy as an instrument of foreign policy – has a negative impact on other aspects of international security, thus, undermines the international community's efforts in stabilizing and bringing peace in several regions and countries.
Another constituent of the geopolitical energy security is the competition for access to strategic energy fields, and other related problems to ensure continuity of global oil supplies.
First, the intensification of various power players in a particular region is accompanied by an increased concern of neighboring and/or other countries, considering this region a "zone of their own privileged interests".
Second, any energy infrastructure – laying of gas pipes, implementation of continental and maritime transportation of energy resources, construction of terminals, energy hubs, oil platforms, strategic reserves, large power plants, etc. - all this inevitably creates a definite presence of the energy player in a region who creates energy infrastructure around its perimeter. Over time, such a presence may go beyond a pure energy field, affecting other aspects of regional policy and security.
It is noteworthy in this context the activation in the waters of the Arctic Ocean of all coastal states, which is associated with the observed climate changes in the region, in particular, the melting of ice, and the emergence of an enabling environment for the development of new oil fields in the Arctic, the size of which is estimated equal to the resources of the Middle East. Certain "skirmishes" already exist at a panel box among the coastal States regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf and economic zones, so competition over access to Arctic resources is gaining momentum.
With regard to continental traffic, it can be stated that energy security is beginning to be reflected in the military and political strategy of some countries and blocs. Here, it should be noted that energy security is already included in the concept of NATO, which was motivated by the danger of destabilization of energy supplies from the side of terrorists by sabotage attacks on the pipeline routes of oil and gas.
This means that NATO will have adequate powers to prevent the risk of supply failure and to respond to possible attacks on energy infrastructure, i.e. threat to energy security of the members of the bloc, by all means.
As evidence, after the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict, during the NATO Summit in Riga, November 2006, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar proposed to extend Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty by inclusion of cases threatening the energy security of the bloc members.  As we know, Article 5 requires commitment of collective defense against aggression made towards any member-country of NATO.
The urgency of this issue was particularly intensified in light of the Georgia-South Ossetia military conflict in August 2008, when oil supplies through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline were temporarily halted.
Geopolitical component of energy security is particularly strong in the background of Russia's energy policy. From the perspective of most Western politicians and analysts, the reduction of gas supplies from Russia to Europe through the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in early 2006 and 2009, was not the consequence of commercial and economic reasons, but political and geopolitical ones. In the international analytical environment there is a widespread opinion that the "gas valve" is a powerful instrument of pressure and promotion of Russia’s national interests in Europe, where the issue of energy dependence of Europe shows up in the political, diplomatic and military agenda of Russian-European relations; this goes beyond purely energy dialogue.
From the above we can state that the geopolitical component of energy security, expressed in terms of “pipeline politics” and “ensuring lasting presence” in a given region, plays a key role in understanding the essential nature of energy security. Trends of dominant energy priorities in the foreign policy of states, in turn, put a serious mark on a number of other issues of regional and world politics. Thus, energy security has become to some extent, a prerequisite for national, regional and international security in general.

A.Isabayev and A.Alikulov
Experts of the Center for Political Studies