The greatest concern was manifested by Russia. Regarding Obama's initiative highly publicized article was jointly written by the former commander of 40th Soviet Army, General Boris Gromov and permanent representative to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin. In the article the authors advocate the continuation of the Afghan mission of the United States and NATO, and believe that its termination would lead to very negative development. According to them, "If NATO comes out of Afghanistan, pretending that the objectives are achieved, then chaos is waiting this country and its neighbors. The withdrawal will give an enormous boost to Islamic militants to destabilize the Central Asian republics and create flows of refugees, many of whom will go to Europe and Russia.
The authors do not simply recommend that NATO stay, they insist on this: "We insist that NATO troops should stay in Afghanistan until the emergence of conditions needed to create a stable political regime capable of independently deter the radical forces and to control the country. That is why we are helping NATO by insuring transit of goods and staff teaching of Afghan security forces, including members of units to combat drug trafficking".
In principle, the concerns of B. Gromov and D. Rogozin are understandable, given the proximity of Afghanistan to the partners of Russia in Central Asia, the problems due to deteriorating situation in Afghanistan can directly affect the overall security of Russia. Also, the successes of the Taliban can directly affect the potential growth of anti-Russian underground in the North Caucasus.
In the meantime, discussions about the possible destabilization of the situation do not reflect the full range of Russian interests in Afghanistan. In fact, for Russia, a factor of Afghanistan and the presence of Western troops in that country represent a more complex phenomenon that is included in the extensive system of geopolitical interests of Moscow, and in many aspects is the trump in building relations with Washington. It was Afghanistan, if carefully trace the course of events since 2001, which has allowed in the beginning to find a point of real interaction between Russia and the U.S., it has also become a tool in their geo-political rivalry.
Thus, helping in the early 2000's U.S. to defeat the Taliban, Russia has managed to raise its status to a level not declarative, but as a real partner to Washington to combat international terrorism. It was also able to significantly reduce the pressure of the Islamist factor as to its problematic territories in the Northern Caucasus, as well as in a number of Central Asian allies. Of course, in exchange for a rapprochement with the U.S., Russia, "weak" at that time, was supposed to come to terms with the growing American presence in Central Asia and the sharp increase in the flow of Afghan drugs in the Russian market.
Until the middle of the first decade of XXI century it seemed that Moscow will increasingly slip into the role of Washington’s "junior partner". However, the surge in prices for oil and natural gas since the beginning of U.S.’s Iraq campaign allowed Russia to pump up its "the financial and economic muscles”, which led to the revival of its geopolitical ambitions. Moscow has begun to announce that it has traditional area of vital interest, which it is not going to yield to the West. Naturally, this led to a general intensification of rivalry with the United States, which became apparent in such painful points as Ukraine, Georgia, the U.S. deployment of missile defense in Eastern Europe.
The most acute problem reached at the second presidential term of George Bush Jr. and just at that moment, Russia received a second "geopolitical gift" (along with the aforementioned rise in prices for petroleum and natural gas due to the destabilization of Iraq) - a sharp activation of Taliban in Afghanistan, who expanded its areas of deployment, as well as jeopardized the supply of NATO troops through the attacks on supply lines coming through the Khyber Pass in Pakistan-Afghan border.
It has become clear that without the creation of alternative "northern route" of deliveries via Russia and Central Asian states, the NATO will not be able to guarantee 100 percent safety supply for their troops in Afghanistan. Immediately, appropriate agreements have been concluded with all parties of the "northern route". Apparently, Washington was forced to make concessions to Moscow on several key issues. Among them, renunciation of the deployment of missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic, and presumably softer stance on the election results in Ukraine, which was won by opponent of the "orange idea," Viktor Yanukovych.
Now, if through the prism of 2011 to look at the role of Afghanistan in modern Russian geopolitics, it can be seen that the dependence of the United States and NATO on the "northern route" gives Moscow the opportunity to deter their plans to strengthen its positions in areas of traditional Russian influence. Withdrawal of Americans out of Afghanistan or its complete stabilization would deprive Russia of such an important resource, tying in many aspects Russia's continental and global politics, but it will mean, respectively, there will be a necessity to restructure a number of approaches on the relationship with the West and the maintenance of regional security.
Regarding the regional dimension of the Russian policy, we can say that it will be forced to transform itself according with what outcome the U.S. and NATO will approach to 2011. If the situation is stabilized and the Americans withdraw their troops, then Moscow will have to take more responsibility, together with its allies in the CSTO and, perhaps, in the SCO to maintain security. Most likely, the need to establish an outpost against the Taliban and foreign fighters will put on the agenda of Russian politics to provide a wide range of military-technical support to the official Kabul.
In the case of the stabilization of Afghanistan (the liquidation of Taliban or achievement of peace agreement between the opposing forces), Russia's position on several fronts will weaken. First and foremost, it concerns the Russian role in the maintenance of regional security, as well as in freight and energy transit, because a stable Afghanistan will open the way for the Central Asian countries to the ports of Pakistan and the rapidly growing energy market in South Asia.
The exercises with the U.S. withdrawal will significantly complicate the usual geo-political picture for the PRC. As in the case of Russia, for China location of U.S. troops in Afghanistan is advantageous, limiting the radical Islamist organizations, including the Uyghur terrorist groups who do not hide their intentions to destabilize the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and break it from China. At the same time, Beijing fears the expansion of U.S. influence in Central Asia, which could also potentially influence the situation in Xinjiang, and, thus, using this fact, press for its interests in dialogue with Chinese authorities on various issues of foreign policy, economy, bilateral trade, Yuan exchange rate, human rights, etc.
Such a dual nature of American presence in Afghanistan has been forcing Beijing over the last 9 years to be in kind of "Cartesian circle" in its geopolitical incarnation. It is worth mentioning, China, nevertheless, has adapted quite successfully to play such a "chess board", and in this regard, the prospect of U.S. withdrawal, in our view, once again mixes up all the cards for the Chinese geopolitics. The situation for China is complicated by the fact that its geopolitical relations with the United States around the Afghan-Central Asian space represent only part of a more complex game, raffled by these two power centers. As in the case of Russia, change in the American presence may cause the shift in all other parts of the system of US-Chinese relations.
China due to its strong economic growth is seen today as one of the most likely contenders for the role of a global rival to the U.S. The political and economic interests of Beijing are increasingly applied to many regions of the world, which will inevitably lead and has already led to a clash with those of Washington. Especially, it is clearly seen, for example, in the commodity area.
The expanding Chinese economy requires more raw materials, much of which is imported to Beijing from Africa, Latin America, Australia, countries of the Eurasian continent. Taking into account that pure economics is only in a theory, but in reality, it always carries a significant political component that actually creates the phenomenon of geopolitics, Beijing willy-nilly has to use political and diplomatic mechanisms for assurances of fuel supply and access to markets.
This, of course, affects the interests of other leading political and economic actors, primarily the U.S., which not only tend to have exclusive access to raw materials, but in some cases control the decision making process on major international transactions between suppliers of raw materials and technologies, and their customers, based on the priority of U.S. interests.
Currently, the geopolitical competition between China and the U.S. has not yet reached the level of open competition, although on some issues there are serious points of tension. Here, as an example may be taken the intention of the U.S. to supply advanced arms to Taiwan for the sum of $ 6.4 billion, in response to which for the first time China has threatened to impose sanctions against a number of American companies, including Boeing, United Technologies and Lockheed Martin.
The sharp worsening of US-China conflict is held back by a very high relationship between the economies of two countries. In 2008, trade between the U.S. and China were valued at 9.2 billion. Although due to the impact of global financial and economic crisis in 2009, it dropped to 6 billion, but experts predict its recovery in the near future if the U.S. economy will keep the current rate of emergence from recession. In addition, as mentioned above, there are very strong bilateral ties in financial sector.
It all creates a very interesting geopolitical phenomenon of "financial and economic containment," reminiscent of "nuclear deterrence" of the Cold War, when the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union and the threat of mutually assured destruction kept the fragile peace between the two superpowers. In the case of China and the United States, the role is given to economic and financial interdependence, in which the victory of one of the actors in the hypothetical geopolitical confrontation may be more than just a "Pyrrhic victory".
Of course, such a balance cannot be eternal, and its destruction will be possible only if, for example, China will be able to decide for itself two fundamental challenges - to find or create the market to offset the loss of U.S. market, and find or create a sound currency or securities that guarantee the safety of the Chinese capital.
Now, if to estimate the factor of Afghanistan and the prospects for withdrawing U.S. troops from that country for the interests of China through the prism of this "economic containment", there is another "Cartesian circle", which overrides the above. It may have many variations based on the number of a kind of "constants".
For example, the U.S.’s military and political progress in Afghanistan as a consequence leads to potential increase of its influence in Central Asia and South Asia, Middle East, which will create problems for geopolitical and geo-economic interests of the Chinese in these regions. But, at the same time, if the U.S. success in Afghanistan is accompanied by improvements in the parameters of its budget and the improvement of the situation in its economy, then it will meet the Chinese economic interests, since it will encourage exports of goods from China and give further impetus to the development of its industry.
In turn, the hardships of the U.S. in Afghanistan are opening a corridor for China's geopolitical activity in Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. However, if the difficulties in Afghanistan continue to provide negative pressure on the U.S. budget and economy, it will have a negative impact on exports of the Chinese economy, social and political situation. Reduced purchasing power of the U.S. market can make it illogical for Beijing to obtain new spheres of influence in resource regions. If manufactured products from imported raw goods are not to find the appropriate distribution, then heavy investments to advance geopolitical interests are not wise to make, especially because of the geopolitical activity expansion threatens Beijing to increase degree of tension with Washington and the West in general. Of course, investing in the expansion of the geopolitical zones of influence can be made from ideological considerations, as in the time it was done by the Soviet Union, but given the pragmatism of the Chinese leadership, the probability of such moves is low.
Along with the above options, you can simulate several scenarios for China related to the possible withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, but almost all of them will rest in the phenomenon of "economic containment", which will significantly affect the overall climate of geopolitical relations between China and the U.S. in the foreseeable future.
Afghanistan occupies an important place in Iran's foreign policy, and not only because both countries have a long common border, but largely because of the presence on Afghan territory of a powerful militant group of the United States and NATO. Taking into account very complex relations between Tehran and Washington, the Iranians, of course, have concerns about their planned military environment, especially given the presence of a large group of U.S. troops in Iraq and their naval forces in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. In this regard, plans of the Americans about an alleged withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan will directly affect the interests of Iran.
At the official level, Tehran stands on the side of the current Afghan government, as they are officially recognized by the international community. The epitome of this recognition is that Iran constitutes one of the largest trade partners of Afghanistan, investing heavily in various projects in western Afghanistan. At the same time the Iranian government opposes any negotiations with the Taliban, whom Iran has almost fought after the murder of seven Iranian diplomats in Mazari-Sharif in 1997. It should also be noted that in the 90's of the last century, Tehran has provided consistent military-technical and financial support to "Northern Alliance", opponents of the Taliban.
Meanwhile, on the background of 2011 the policy of Iran along with other actors is likely to undergo some changes. In this regard, the visit of the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Kabul in March 2010 looks like quite obvious. According to several reputable experts, such as the head of the Center for the Study of Modern Iran Rajab Safarov, the visit of Iranian president wore in general exploratory nature and was aimed at clarifying the sentiment in the leadership of Afghanistan and the limits of authority of Hamid Karzai in the American military presence.
At the same time, this visit was in line with Iran’s main strategic objectives - to prevent the establishment on the territory of Afghanistan a military staging ground, which may endanger the safety of the Iranian state or be used as a tool for the exertion of pressure. Given this, one can understand Tehran’s desire to clarify the essence of the processes that are currently running the White House regarding the Afghan crisis. Hence, most likely, the further selection of tactical actions in Tehran will be determined by the U.S.’s actions.
Least of all, in terms of political pragmatism, Iran's interests would be met if there is such a stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan, as a result of either successful completion of the process of national reconciliation, or total defeat of the Taliban, where pro-American government will come to power in Kabul, which legally confirms the presence of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. Given the succession of events, Iran will not have serious intra-Afghan resources to effectively influence the development of the situation. It would actually be taken in the geopolitical mites, if the Americans would retain a military presence in Iraq.
But the withdrawal of American troops without a final solution of the Afghan crisis will bring Iran little dividends. Estimated growth of the Afghan conflict through an existent direct confrontation between Kabul and the Taliban would not only heighten the tension in the region and put an end to many projects of regional integration, but also cause another exodus of refugees into neighboring countries, as well as turn Afghanistan into an arena of confrontation of global and regional forces that would stay open or hidden behind the warring Afghan parties. Tehran, naturally, will not stand by - it will have to be drawn into the intra-Afghan events, supporting the authorities, which could lead to a paradoxical situation where the U.S. and Iran could theoretically be in the same camp.
Along with this scenario, there is a third one, which leaves after 2011 the current situation without changes characterized by the struggle between NATO and Kabul on the one hand, and the Taliban on the other. This option is more or less favorable to Tehran as it allows keeping the current status quo in the region. Of course, there are also options to complete the stabilization of Afghanistan and its conversion to a neutral state, but so far, given the global and regional geopolitical realities, it looks like a utopia.
Among those countries whose security is directly affected by events in Afghanistan are the states of Central Asia. Since the beginning of the antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan, they have traditionally provided considerable assistance in stabilizing the situation in that country, thereby, ensuring their own and regional stability in general. However, the possible change in the format of the Western military presence in Afghanistan is once again made relevant to the region and the expert community a half-forgotten concern about the security of Central Asia endangered of the line of subversive activity of terrorist groups (at the time, NATO, defeating the Taliban, actually removed the issue from the agenda).
Today, there are two opinions about the ability of religious-extremist forces based in Afghanistan and Pakistan to extend their expansion into the territory of Central Asia. The experts, who consider such a possibility real, refer primarily to the geographic features of the border area, which lies between Afghanistan and Central Asia. The most vulnerable areas, in their opinion, are the Tajik land, passing mainly on the complex mountainous terrain, as well as the Turkmen, the prevailing desert-steppe landscape.
Another group of analysts hold diametrically opposite view, believing that the border states of Central Asia are fully capable to become a reliable barrier to terrorist groups, nurturing hope for a different kind of caliphate. At the same time, the pessimists and optimists are in unison that the most protected area is the one of Uzbekistan.
They also agree that the transformation of Central Asia as a bastion of protection of regional stability is possible not only through its own efforts, but also in active collaboration with leading geopolitical forces - the U.S., NATO, Russia and China. Mostly, this is the case of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, least of Uzbekistan as a state possessing the most capable and largest army in the region.
All countries in the region, in principle, understand their strengths and weaknesses in terms of security, so Washington's plans for an alleged withdrawal from Afghanistan, cannot make them not worry. At the same time, for them it is not confined only to security issues, but Washington's plans and the actual course of development of the situation in Afghanistan affects the deeper layers, underlying the entire Central Asian geopolitics.
Analysts engaged in the region know well that in the last decade the Central Asia has developed a fairly stable pattern of foreign policy conduct, which is the skillful balancing of a number of regional actors among the major centers of power. In many ways, this scheme is dependent on the factor of the Afghan crisis, which defines the logic of partnership and the activity of the SCO, CSTO, NATO, and the realization of specific political and military projects.
In fact, this tactical scheme solves three problems - the protection of the Central Asian states their own security; obtaining political and economic dividends, raising their own geopolitical subjectivity.
In this context, the changing nature of the presence of U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan and the progress of internal political and military processes in this country cannot help but reflect on all the constituent elements of the established scheme. Theoretically, this could lead to new models of geopolitical maneuvering that in the future will require a separate large study.

Rustam Makhmudov
Expert of the Center for Political Studies